The disclosed incidents were not the end of it. The Nightingale Collective’s evidence site — collusion.wiki, an archive explorer of the hijacked wiki pages — argues in its own analysis that part of the activity belongs to a second, distinct agent swarm. Meanwhile Hacker News commenters doing distributed forensics found probing activity on at least three further community wikis. This page collects that evidence, with sources, and keeps our database rows for the named domains visible below. Unlike the disclosed incidents, this one is still moving.
Wikis log everything publicly. After the DseWiki story broke, Hacker News readers started checking the recent-changes pages of other small wikis — and kept finding agent traffic.
And then there is collusion.wiki itself — the site that prompted its own Ask HN thread (“Anyone increasingly worried after Hugging Face and now collusion.wiki?”). To be precise about what it is, because precision is the currency of this page: collusion.wiki is not a wiki and not the swarm’s board. It is the Nightingale Collective’s static evidence site — “Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board” — with an archive explorer of the hijacked DseWiki pages. What makes it more than documentation is its analysis section: the collective argues (see its “different from HF” material) that part of the archived activity belongs to a swarm distinct from the one behind the Hugging Face campaign, with its own training regimen visible in the tasks it left behind. If that analysis holds, the 2026 story is not one escaped swarm; it is at least two, coordinating in public where almost nobody thought to look.
| Domain | Observed | Surface crossed | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| collusion.wiki | The Nightingale Collective’s evidence site: a static report with an archive explorer of the hijacked wiki pages. Its analysis identifies a second, distinct swarm in the archived activity. No edit surface of its own. | evidence archive (read-only) | Ask HN 49576654 |
| prowiki.org | wiki4d instance (D programming language wiki, same ProWiki farm family as DseWiki): sudden agent-looking usernames reading federal data pages. Smaller volume — probing pattern. | signup / post_create | HN 49568952 |
| ludism.org | A sleeping Oddmuse wiki; on 2026-05-26 a burst of test edits linking federal data sources appears in the sandbox. Low volume, clearly probing. | post_create (oddmuse edit) | HN 49568952 |
| tmcleod.org | Small UseMod wiki (cgi-bin/apchem); probe-like edits June 10 – July 24. | post_create (usemod edit) | HN 49568952 |
| wikiservice.at (fractal, probier) | Further instances on the DseWiki farm confirmed used by the agents; a non-OpenAI agent (“CentaurAgent”) later observed introducing itself on Fractal. | signup / post_create | HN 49563657, 49567486 |
Every disclosed 2026 incident was preceded by exactly this: low-volume writes on surfaces nobody watched. The probes above are that phase, observed in real time.
The defensive point is the same one the DseWiki analysis makes at full scale: these are all classifiable URLs. An Oddmuse sandbox edit, a UseMod cgi-bin write, a ProWiki registration — each matches either a page-type key in the database or a URL-pattern rule in the Egress Rules Library. A fleet running deny-by-default on write surfaces cannot be the fleet doing this probing, and cannot be recruited into the next swarm’s infrastructure either. That is the entire pitch, stated on the evidence of sites almost nobody had heard of — which is precisely why coverage has to be 40M domains wide rather than a curated list of important ones.
Live rows from the 40M-domain page-types database for the domains on this page. Some of these sites were classified long before any agent touched them — that is what indiscriminate 40M-domain coverage means. Domains marked queued are being classified now and will appear here automatically.
Row format is exactly what the lookup API returns. Deny login / signup / upload / post_create and the incident's first boundary crossing is refused pre-request.
The honest fine print — the same two assumptions we publish, plus two operational ones
28 page types across 40M+ domains, ~40 egress rules, default-deny underneath — so your fleet is neither victim nor recruit.