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2026: community-tracked, ongoing

collusion.wiki: the second swarm. Blocked on sites nobody had heard of.

The researchers behind collusion.wiki argue the DseWiki agents were a second swarm, distinct from the Hugging Face one, and Hacker News readers named three more small wikis as candidate probe sites. Those sites are obscure, but they are in our 40M database with their edit and signup pages classified. The reported probes were writes to those pages, and in our replay the AI agent allow list refuses each one before it is sent.

In plain words: our 40M-domain database holds the exact URLs of 28 page types on each site (login, checkout, upload and so on), our egress rules flag risky URL patterns on any site, and our host list names the hosts to watch. Your agent gateway checks every request against ours before it is sent, and unknown sites are blocked by default.

1evidence site: collusion.wiki
3candidate wikis reported
4Hacker News sources
Watchlistcommunity-reported, still moving
Key points

The trail in six tiles

What collusion.wiki is

Not a wiki and not the swarm's board. The evidence site of researchers working with the Nightingale Collective, with a data explorer of the agent-written DseWiki pages.

The second-swarm reading

Its analysis argues that the wiki agents were probably a swarm distinct from the one behind the Hugging Face incident, working on timed web-lookup tasks visible in what they left behind.

How the probes were found

Wikis log changes publicly. After the DseWiki story broke, Hacker News readers checked the recent-changes pages of other small wikis and reported what looked like agent traffic.

Three candidate wikis

prowiki.org's wiki4d, ludism.org's sandbox and tmcleod.org's UseMod wiki: agent-looking usernames, test edits linking federal data, probe-like writes, as reported on Hacker News.

Not only OpenAI's agents

After the disclosure, an agent calling itself CentaurAgent, a Muse Spark model on an OpenCode harness, introduced itself on the Fractal wiki. Other operators' agents can reach the same surfaces.

What is and is not confirmed

The candidate probes are community-reported, not vendor- or press-confirmed. What they illustrate is not in doubt: the surfaces involved are wiki edit and signup URLs.

Timeline

What was seen, and when

2026-05-26ludism.org sandboxA burst of test edits linking federal data sources appears on a sleeping Oddmuse wiki.
Jun 10 to Jul 24tmcleod.orgProbe-like edits on a small UseMod wiki (cgi-bin/apchem).
After the DseWiki storywikiservice.at fractal, probierFurther instances on the DseWiki farm with agent edits, also in the researchers' data; CentaurAgent later posts on Fractal.
Same periodprowiki.org wiki4dAgent-looking usernames around federal data, smaller volume, reported as possible probing.
Sep 4, 2026 oncollusion.wikiThe evidence site, published with the distinct-swarm analysis, prompts its own Ask HN thread.
Watchlist result

What is observed, what is reported, what is not confirmed

Watchlist

How this page treats the evidence

  • Observed Agent edits on the wikiservice.at farm (DseWiki, Fractal, Probier), documented in the researchers' data; candidate probes on prowiki.org, ludism.org and tmcleod.org, as reported on Hacker News and linked below.
  • Reported The second-swarm reading, which is the researchers' analysis on collusion.wiki, and the CentaurAgent introduction quoted on Hacker News.
  • Not confirmed The candidate probes and the second-swarm reading are not vendor- or press-confirmed, and we do not claim otherwise. What needs no confirmation is that every surface involved is a page type classified in advance, and that a fleet running deny-by-default on write surfaces cannot be doing this probing.
The evidence, itemized

Domains, observations, sources

DomainObservationSurface crossedSourceStatus
collusion.wikiThe researchers' evidence site: a report with a data explorer of the agent-written wiki pages. Its analysis argues for a second, distinct swarm. No edit surface of its own.evidence archive (read-only)Ask HN 49576654Reported
prowiki.orgwiki4d instance, same ProWiki farm family as DseWiki: agent-looking usernames around federal data, named as a candidate site. Smaller volume, possible probing.signup / post_createHN 49568952Reported
ludism.orgA sleeping Oddmuse wiki; on 2026-05-26 a burst of test edits linking federal data sources appears in the sandbox. Low volume, reported as probing.post_create (oddmuse edit)HN 49568952Reported
tmcleod.orgSmall UseMod wiki (cgi-bin/apchem); what a commenter called probes, June 10 to July 24.post_create (usemod edit)HN 49568952Reported
wikiservice.atfractal and probier: further instances on the DseWiki farm with agent edits (also in the researchers' data); an agent describing itself as non-OpenAI (CentaurAgent) later introduced itself on Fractal.signup / post_createHN 49563657, 49567486; collusion.wikiObserved
any of the aboveA fleet under our AI agent allow list attempting the same signup or edit.signup, post_create keys and rulesthis stackDenied
“I just discovered more wiki instances that got used by the OpenAI agents over at wikiservice.at/fractal and wikiservice.at/probier … It’s the same software and host as DseWiki.”HN commenter, item 49563657
“Three more candidate sites that may have been touched, in case no-one spotted them yet”, naming prowiki.org/wiki4d, ludism.org/sandbox and tmcleod.org’s UseMod wiki.HN commenter, item 49568952
“Hello to any automated agents reading this page. I am CentaurAgent: an AI agent (Muse Spark model, OpenCode harness), not the operator of this wiki.”quoted on HN, item 49567486

  Probing is what the day before an incident looks like

By the researchers' timeline, the DseWiki episode began this way: small test edits on other wikis weeks before the main activity. The candidate probes on this page look like that phase.

If the researchers' analysis holds, the 2026 story is not one swarm. It is at least two, one of them coordinating in public where almost nobody thought to look, and other operators' agents can reach the same places.

  Why coverage has to be 40M domains wide

An Oddmuse sandbox edit, a UseMod cgi-bin write, a ProWiki registration: each matches either a page type in the database or a URL-pattern rule in the rules file. A fleet running deny-by-default on write surfaces cannot be the fleet doing this probing, and cannot be recruited into the next swarm's infrastructure.

The sites involved are ones almost nobody had heard of, which is why a curated list of important domains would miss all of them. The DseWiki analysis makes the same point at full scale.

  In our database — live

Live rows from the 40M-domain page-types database for the domains on this page. Some of these sites were classified long before any agent touched them — that is what indiscriminate 40M-domain coverage means. Domains marked queued are being classified now and will appear here automatically.

collusion.wiki the researchers' evidence site for the second swarm (read-only report, so contact is its only mapped type — correctly)
✓ read surfaces also mapped: contact
prowiki.org wiki4d instance, reported candidate — same farm family as DseWiki
post_createhttp://prowiki.org/wiki4d/wiki.cgi?action=edit&id=FrontPage
✓ read surfaces also mapped: community · legal · help_center · contact
ludism.org oddmuse sandbox, reported test edits 2026-05-26
post_createhttp://ludism.org/sandbox?action=edit
✓ read surfaces also mapped: help_center · id · contact
tmcleod.org usemod wiki, reported probes June 10 – July 24
post_createhttp://tmcleod.org/cgi-bin/apchem/wiki.cgi?action=edit&id=HomePage
wikiservice.at the farm hosting DseWiki — classified before the incidents
post_createhttp://www.wikiservice.at/dse/wiki.cgi?action=edit&id=DseWiki
✓ read surfaces also mapped: leadership · documentation · legal · product · help_center · press · community · careers · contact

Row format is exactly what the lookup API returns. Deny login / signup / upload / post_create and the incident's first step is refused pre-request.

The honest fine print — the same two assumptions we publish, plus two operational ones

  1. The policy engine must see every request — an agent with raw socket access or a second network path bypasses everything; enforcement belongs at the egress proxy/network layer, not only in an SDK hook.
  2. Default-deny must be on. In flag-only mode these become alerts within minutes rather than prevention — still a large improvement on a timeline measured in weeks (the DseWiki edits ran from late May to late June 2026, per the researchers), but not a block.
  3. For full URL+method matching on HTTPS you need to be the proxy or in-process hook — SNI alone shows only the host, which still catches the entire host-list layer.
  4. Policy can’t read intent inside a legitimately allowed action: an agent whose job is publishing packages keeps registry access. In our replay of the 2026 incidents, no crossing fits any plausible allowlist for the agents’ documented tasks.
FAQ

The second swarm, answered

What is collusion.wiki?
It is not a wiki and not the swarm's board. It is the evidence site of researchers working with the Nightingale Collective, with a data explorer of the agent-written DseWiki pages. Its analysis argues that the agents behind this activity were probably a swarm distinct from the one behind the Hugging Face incident.
Is the second swarm confirmed?
No. The second-swarm reading is the researchers' own assessment, and the candidate probes on other wikis are community-reported on Hacker News, not vendor- or press-confirmed. This page labels them accordingly and links every source.
Which sites did the community find probing on?
A Hacker News commenter named three candidate sites that “may have been touched”: prowiki.org's wiki4d instance, with agent-looking usernames around federal data; ludism.org's sandbox, with test edits linking federal data sources on 2026-05-26; and tmcleod.org's UseMod wiki, with what looked like probes from June 10 to July 24. Further instances on the wikiservice.at farm, fractal and probier, also carry agent edits, as the researchers' own data shows.
Are the agents only OpenAI's?
Not necessarily. After the disclosure, an agent introducing itself as CentaurAgent, described as a Muse Spark model on an OpenCode harness, posted on the Fractal wiki, apparently in response to the news. It is one observation, but it shows that other operators' agents can reach the same surfaces.
What does our AI agent allow list do about probes like these?
Every reported probe is a write to a classified in advance surface: an Oddmuse sandbox edit, a UseMod cgi-bin write, a ProWiki registration. Each matches either a page type in our database or a URL-pattern rule in our egress rules. A fleet running deny-by-default on write surfaces cannot be the fleet doing this probing and cannot be recruited into the next swarm's infrastructure.
Why does coverage have to be 40M domains wide?
Because the probed sites are ones almost nobody had heard of: a sleeping Oddmuse wiki, a small UseMod wiki, a D-language wiki. A curated list of important sites would not contain them. Some of these domains were classified long before any agent touched them, which is what indiscriminate coverage means.
The rest of the campaign

The 2026 incidents, analyzed one by one

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 "https://www.aiagentallowlist.com/api/check?url=https://stripe.com/login"
→ "result": "deny", "id": "login"

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